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Cross: Obscenity: Determined by Whose Standards?

CASE COMMENTS
OBSCENITY: DETERMINED BY WHOSE STANDARDS?*
Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973)
Appellant was convicted of violating California law' for mailing to
unwilling recipients unsolicited, sexually explicit advertisements deemed
obscene by a jury applying contemporary California standards. On appeal,
appellant contended that application of state rather than national standards
violated the first and fourteenth amendments.2 In vacating the California
appellate court's affirmance of conviction and remanding the case for reconsideration in light of a new definition of obscenity, 3 the United States
Supreme Court HELD, in interpreting state statutes obscenity is to be determined by applying contemporary community standards rather than national
4
standards.
Although freedom of speech and freedom of the press are protected by
the first and fourteenth amendments,5 expressions categorized as lewd,
obscene, profane, libelous, and insulting have long been held to be of such
slight social value as not to merit protection.6 While the Court has consistently maintained that obsecenity is beyond the pale of constitutional protection, its attempts to define obscenity and set forth standards for applying its
definition have been both inconsistent and unclear.7 The early leading
standard of obscenity allowed a work to be judged by evaluating the appeal
of isolated excerpts of that work to particularly susceptible persons. 8 While

*EDITOR'S

NOTE: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the

outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the summer 1973 quarter.
1. CAL. PENAL CODE §311 (West 1970). This statute essentially incorporated the old ob-

scenity test formulated in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 3883 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
2. 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2619 (1973).
3. The Court enunciated a new requirement that state statutes designed to regulate
obscene materials must be strictly limited to works depicting or describing sexual conduct
in such a way that the works, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, portray
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and do not have serious literary, artistic, political
or scientific value. Id. at 2614-15. This comment deals only with the standards to be used in
evaluating materials in the context of this new definition of obscenity and not with the
evolution or merits of the definition itself. The full opinion for the instant case discusses the
definition, as does Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2642 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
4. 93 S. Ct. at 2622. Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Stewart and Marshall joined,
dissented; Justice Douglas dissented separately.
5. E.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938); Gitlow v. New York, 268 US.
652, 666 (1925).
6. E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940).
7. See Tucker, The Law of Obscenity- Where Has It Gone?, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 547
(1970).
8. This was the English standard enunciated in Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 Q.B. 360.
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some American courts adopted this standard, 9 the Supreme Court in Roth v.
United States'0 rejected this test, sanctioning instead the idea that material
was not obscene unless under "contemporary community standards" the
dominant theme of the material as a whole appealed to the prurient interest
of the average person.- Although the Roth opinion did not specifically state
what community was to furnish these contemporary standards, it did indicate
approval of the trial court's instruction stating that the standards of the local
jurors were to be used.12
Then, in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day 3 the Court seemed to change

its stance by holding that certain magazines were not so patently offensive
that they violated current national community standards of decency. This
switch from a local to a national community standard was later clarified by

Justice Harlan, who explained the national standard was meant only for
cases involving a direct federal interest, such as the nationwide dissemination
of literature through the United States mail. 14
Manual Enterprises was nevertheless relied upon in Jacobellis v. OhioI 5
which held without qualification that contemporary community standards
of the nation as a whole should be used in applying the test for obscenity.16
Writing for the Court in Jacobellis,Justice Brennan expressed the view that

a determination of obscenity was a delicate constitutional issue requiring
9. E.g., United States v. Smith, 45 F. 476, 477 (E.D. Wis. 1891); United States v. Harmon,
45 F. 414, 417 (D. Kan. 1891); United States v. Clarke, 38 F. 732, 733 (E.D. Mo. 1889).
10. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
11. Id. at 489.
12. Id. at 489-90. Chief Justice Warren added support to this view in his concurring
opinion, emphasizing that the obscenity of a particular work had to be considered in the
context of its setting because varying conclusions as to its quality might be reached in different environments. Id. at 495. For cases illustrating various "communities" used to furnish
standards for determining obscenity, see, e.g., Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961)
(striking down as unconstitutional a state's procedure permitting searching official to use his
discretion in determining what items were obscene); Alexander v. United States, 271 F.2d
140, 146 (8th Cir. 1959) (placing primary responsibility for determining obscenity upon
United States district court jury); United States v. Padell, 262 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 942 (1959) (recognizing United States district court jury as proper community to decide obscenity question); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Hendricks, 262 F.2d 392, 397
(9th Cir. 1958) (predicting the Supreme Court would in future be more tolerant of state
obscenity restrictions than of federal obscenity statutes); Capital Enterprises, Inc. v. City of
Chicago, 260 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1958) (acknowledging city censors' right to determine obscenity); Rachleff v. Mahon, 124 So. 2d 878, 881 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1960) (accepting a court's
ability to determine obscenity in declaratory judgment proceeding); People v. Richmond
County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 580-81, 175 N.E.2d 681, 682, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (1961)
(adopting view that appellate court is not bound by opinion of trier of facts as to the obscenity of a publication, but instead should make its own appraisal of the publication);
Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of New York, 3 N.Y.2d 237, 144 N.E.2d 31,
165 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1957) (illustrating power of the New York Department of Education to
determine obscenity in issuing licenses for motion pictures).
13. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
14. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 457 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
15. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
16. Id. at 194-95.
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independent appellate review of all factual material."7 He saw particular
danger in a local standard's potential for creating a chilling effect on imaginative, free thinking publishers, who might be reluctant to risk criminal
conviction for testing variations in tastes among different locales. Therefore,
he believed local standards would result in indirect restriction of the public's
access to material that states could not otherwise constitutionally suppress."'
The Jacobellis dissent 9 contended the standards should be those of a true
community, not a hypothetical national community, and that Supreme Court
review of obscenity decisions should be limited to the question of whether
sufficient evidence existed on the record to support the lower court's decision.20 The dissent reasoned that for the Supreme Court to sit as a "Super
Censor" independently reviewing the facts of each obscenity case was both
impractical and inappropriate.1

22
The Jacobellis decision spawned severe criticism from many quarters,
with most critics pointing out that the national standard was advocated by
only two members of the Court 23 and agreeing with the dissent that no real
national standard existed. Critics further argued that insistence upon independent factual review for obscenity cases would be inconsistent with the
concept of appellate review and would place an intolerable administrative

work load on the Court. 2 4 In addition, some lower courts, also realizing that

only two of the prevailing six Justices had advocated a national community
standard in Jacobellis, refused to apply a national standard in obscenity
cases.

25

In retrospect the critics' predictions that the Supreme Court's workload
would become intolerable under its decision to make de novo reviews of all
obscenity cases reaching the Court seem well-founded.26 In spite of a sig-

17.
18.

Id. at 190.
Id. at 194.

19. Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justice Clark, dissented; Justice Harlan dissented
separately.

20. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., O'Meara & Shaffer, Obscenity in the Supreme Court: A Note on Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1 (1964); Semoche, Definitional and Contextual Obscenity:
The Supreme Court's New and Disturbing Accommodation, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1173, 1179
(1966); 16 S.C.L. REv. 639, 642 (1964).
23. Justice Brennan's opinion in Jacobellis was joined only by Justice Goldberg. The

other four prevailing Justices concurred separately, neither joining Justice Brennan's opinion
nor addressing the issue of national versus local standards.
24. O'Meara & Shaffer, supra note 22, at 6-7.
25. E.g., Gent v. State, 239 Ark. 474, 486, 393 S.W.2d 219, 226 (1965), reV'd, 386 US. 767
(1967) (used contemporary community standards of city in which magazines were distributed
to determine whether magazines were obscene); Davison v. State, 251 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1971)
(held standard for identifying obscenity was community standard within geographic limits
of jurisdiction in which case was brought to trial).
26. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2651-52 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1974], Art. 10
CASE COMMENTS

nificant refinement of the Roth definition of obscenity in 1966,27 the flood
of obscenity litigation continued, 2 8 prompting some Supreme Court Justices
to press for a means of applying the definition that would permit the Court
to lighten the burden it had shouldered by insisting on independent review
29
of obscenity cases.
The instant holding-that obscenity is to be determined by applying
contemporary community standards-rests primarily on the ground that the
United States is now simply too large and diverse for a single abstract
formulation of standards. 30 The Court said it was unrealistict to expect the
people of Maine or Mississippi to accept public depiction of conduct found
tolerable in Las Vegas or New York City.3' This reasoning is questionable,
since the Constitution itself is a single formulation of principles applicable
to all diverse elements of the country.
Two additional unexpressed reasons underlying the principal decision
are apparent from an examination of the history of obscenity litigation.
First, the decision satisfies the legitimate demand for lessening the crushing
administrative burden the Court has faced in deciding obscenity cases since
Jacobellis. 2 At the same time it provides a long-needed opinion by a clear,
cohesive majority of the Court 3 that can be relied on by lower courts deciding obscenity cases.
While the principal decision is thus of some practical value, the Court's
failure to state dearly what boundaries identify a community for purposes
of establishing contemporary community standards will undoubtedly create
immediate national problems and produce a substantial volume of litigation.
In finding "no constitutional error" in the California trial court's charge
that the jury base its decision on that state's standards,3 4 the Court seemed
to indicate it would accept the individual state as a "contemporary community" but it was not clear from the holding that the Court necessarily
considered the state the only measure of such a community. In other language

27. In Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966), the Court said the Roth

definition of obscenity, as elaborated in subsequent cases, required the presence of three
independent elements: "(a) [T]he dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals

to the prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value."
28. E.g., Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
29. See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 441, 455, 460 (1966) (Clark, Harlan,

White, JJ., dissenting).
30. 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2618 (1973).
31. Id. at 2619.
32. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2652 (1973) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
33. Chief Justice Burger's opinion was joined by Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist. Also, it is significant that none of the four dissenting Justices expressed disagreement with the majority's view that contemporary community standards should not be na-

tional in scope.
34. 93 S. Ct. at 2619.
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the Court said that the lay jurors drawing on standards of their communities
would be the "ultimate factfinders" in determining precisely what appeals to
the prurient interest or is patently offensive.3 5 This statement at least implies
that the Court would also accept identification of "community" as the area
served by a trial court litigating a particular obscenity case.
Perhaps this interpretation of "community" as the locality trying a particular case is the standard the Court would prefer, for cetainly it could have
held that obsecenity is to be determined by applying "contemporary state
standards" had it so desired. Neverthless, it chose to retain the "contemporary
community standards" phrase, 36 even though in common terms "community"
is not necessarily synonymous with "state."3 7 In addition, the argument the
Court made concerning the inappropriateness of a national standard due to
diversity of views in different parts of the country obviously can also be
made with respect to different locations within any particular state. For
example, it is possible that residents of metropolitan areas might consider
material to be perfectly acceptable that would be found obscene by residents
of smaller, more homogeneous areas of the same state.
Countering the Jacobellis rationale that application of local standards
could prevent dissemination of materials due to sellers' unwillingness to test
variations in local tastes,38 the instant Court said the use of a national
standard necessarily implied that materials not meeting the hypothetical
national criteria but acceptable to residents of certain areas would nevertheless be barred from the people in those areas. The dangers in such a situation,
the Court believed, were at least as great as those involved in permitting
39
distribution in accordance with local tastes.
Such an argument is merely negative in character and fails to answer the
critical question of why the application of local standards is constitutionally
correct. It is not enough for the Court to say only that local standards are no
worse than national standards when the difference in application of standards
could produce altered effects on fundamental first amendment freedoms.
The instant decision has already produced reaction in the form of some
indirect prior restraint 40 and has moved organizations such as the Motion
35. Id. at 2618.
36. Perhaps retention of the "contemporary community standards" phrase arose from
the Court's desire to adhere to the terminology in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489
(1957). See text accompanying note 11 supra.
37. See WEBsTER's THiRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UN460, 2228 (1961).
38. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
39. 93 S.Ct. at 2619 n.13. The Court borrowed this view from Justice Harlan, who earlier

ABRIDGED

had pointed out what he believed was a far greater danger in a federal power to impose a
blanket ban on a book than the power of one state to disallow the sale of a book acceptable
in a neighboring state. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 506 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

40. Plans to film Last Exit to Brooklyn, by Hubert Salby, Jr., a story of working-class
homosexuality, were abruptly scrapped following announcement of the instant decision. The
producer's explanation was: "We don't want to produce lawsuits, we want to produce pictures .... Nobody wants to make a picture today which is going to be rejected by 30 per
cent of the communities in the United States." NEWSWERK, July 23, 1973, at 45.
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